

CIA/DCI/BRIEF 174-75
11 NOVEMBER 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86-01068R000300040026-6

SECRET/NFD

1 OF 1

BRIEF

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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MIDDLE EAST ASIA BRIEF 17⁴-754

1. LEBANON: WITH THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE NOW TEN DAYS OLD AND GENERALLY RESPECTED, PRIME MINISTER KARAMI IS MAKING A RENEWED EFFORT TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS."

KARAMI HAS CALLED ON THE COUNTRY'S WARRING FACTIONS TO ALLOW THE LEBANESE ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE TO PLAY A MORE FORCEFUL ROLE IN RESTORING CIVIL ORDER. ONCE CALM HAS RETURNED, HE PLEDGED THE GOVERNMENT WILL WORK TO IMPLEMENT COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.4

KARAMI'S ASSERTION THAT SECURITY AND-REFORM ARE INSEPARABLE REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO BE EVEN-HANDED AND TO ELICIT CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. HIS STATEMENT THAT ORDER MUST BE RESTORED BEFORE REFORMS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED, HOWEVER, CONSTITUTES A CONCESSION TO RIGHT-WING CHRISTIANS.4

PHALANGES PARTY LEADER JUMAYYIL HAS APPROVED KARAMI'S INITIATIVE, CLAIMING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS FINALLY CONCEDED THE PHALANGISTS' BASIC POINT: THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST ASSEET ITS AUTHORITY. LIKE KARAMI, HOWEVER, JUMAYYIL SPOKE ONLY IN GENERAL

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TERMS AND AVOIDED PROMISING ANYTHING SPECIFIC.4

LEBANESE LEFTISTS HAVE NOT REACTED/ THEY MAY WITHHOLD COMMENT UNTIL KARAMI ELABORATES HIS IDEAS. THE PRIME MINISTER IS EXPECTED TO SPELL OUT HIS PROGRAM AT A CABINET MEETING TOMORROW. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. ANGOLA: ANGOLA DRIFTED LEADERLESS INTO INDEPENDENCE MONDAY AS THE PORTUGUESE LEFT THE TERRITORY WITHOUT PASSING SOVEREIGNTY TO ANY OF THE THREE WARRING LIBERATION GROUPS. THE PORTUGUESE HIGH COMMISSIONER LEFT LUANDA AND MERELY ANNOUNCED THAT THE TERRITORY WAS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE "ANGOLAN PEOPLE."4

THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA, WHICH CONTROLS LUANDA AND SOME OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, PROCLAIMED A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WENT AHEAD WITH PLANNED ACTIVITIES TO CELEBRATE. MEANWHILE, THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANGOLA'S THIRD LIBERATION GROUP, THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA, ANNOUNCED A RIVAL GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT OUT OF KINSHASA, WHERE THE NATIONAL FRONT AND NATIONAL UNION HAD BEEN CONFERRING, THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF

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IMPORT

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THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE NOVA LISBOA, WHICH THEY HAVE
RENAMED HUAMBO.Y

THE RIVAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE COMPRISED OF A PRESIDENT, A
PRIME MINISTER, AND A 24-MEMBER COUNCIL OF REVOLUTION. THE
GOVERNMENT LEADERS WERE NOT ANNOUNCED.Y

IN A SEPARATE NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT, THE NATIONAL UNION CALLED
FOR A CEASE-FIRE, A NEUTRALIZATION OF LUANDA, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY MADE UP OF THE THREE LIBERATION
GROUPS.Y

AT THE SAME TIME, FIGHTING WAS CONTINUING. ACCORDING TO
THE LATEST PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS, A COMBINED NATIONAL
FRONT - NATIONAL UNION FORCE TOOK NOVO REDONDO AND PORTO AMBOTH
MONDAY LEAVING THE POPULAR MOVEMENT WITH ONLY LUANDA AS A
MAJOR POINT OF RESUPPLY.Y

A NUMBER OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE HAD CLOSE TIES
WITH THE POPULAR MOVEMENT--CONGO, GUINEA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND
GUINEA-BISSAUR--ARE EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE THE POPULAR MOVEMENT
GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, A VARIETY OF REPORTS MONDAY INDICATED THAT

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A NUMBER OF AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INTEND TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION FROM EITHER RIVAL CLAIMANT. UGANDAN PRESIDENT AMIN, SPEAKING AS HEAD OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, CALLED ON OAU MEMBERS TO BE NEUTRAL TOWARD THE ANGOLAN SITUATION. {SECRET}4

3. BANGLADESH: THERE HAVE BEEN NO NEW ERUPTIONS WITHIN THE BENGALIEE MILITARY SINCE A REVOLT AMONG ENLISTED MEN FLARED BRIEFLY IN DACCA OVER THE WEEKEND, BUT THE SITUATION REMAINS FRAGILE.4

FURTHER TROUBLE COULD BE INSTIGATED BY A FAR-LEFT POLITICAL GROUP THAT HAS EMERGED AS A FORCE AMONG THE TROOPS. INDIA WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE IF THE DACCA GOVERNMENT CAN REIMPOSE ITS AUTHORITY ON THE ENLISTED MEN.4

MOST OF THE REBELLIOUS TROOPS REPORTEDLY HAVE SURRENDERED THEIR ARMS AND REJOINED THEIR UNITS. OFFICERS HAD BEEN UNNERVED BY THE MUTINY, BU THEY NOW SEEM TO BE RETURNING TO THEIR POSTS.4

THE ENLISTED MEN, APPARENTLY MOTIVATED IN PART BY LONG-STANDING GRIEVANCES, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFUSION OF THE PAST FEW DAYS TO REGISTER THEIR DISSATISFACTION. THEY REPORTEDLY WERE INCITED TO MUTINY BY MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY, A

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POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUP WITH A VAGUE LEFTIST IDEOLOGY AND A REPUTATION FOR BEING ANTI-INDIA. ALTHOUGH THE PARTY HAS NEVER DEVELOPED BROAD CIVILIAN SUPPORT, IT SEEMS TO HAVE GAINED SOME INFLUENCE AMONG THE MUTINOUS TROOPS. A FORMER LIEUTENANT COLONEL WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY SERVES AS THE LINK BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE ARMY.4

THE NEW STRONGMAN, GENERAL ZIA, STILL APPEARS TO HOLD THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY, BUT HE NEEDS THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS IF THE ENLISTED MEN ARE TO BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. THE OFFICERS MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY RE-ESTABLISHING TRUST BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE TROOPS. SOME HAVE REPORTEDLY LONG IGNORED THE CONCERNS OF THE MEN.4

IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, INDIA'S CENSORED PRESS HAS REVERTED TO TREATING EVENTS IN BANGLADESH IN FACTUAL, RELATIVELY UNEMOTIONAL TERMS. THIS IS A DEPARTURE FROM DRAMATIZED ACCOUNTS PUBLISHED LATE LAST WEEK. IN BOTH CASES, THE PRESS HAS PROBABLY BEEN REFLECTING INDIAN GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE.4

NEW DELHI'S APPARENT INCLINATION TO GIVE ZIA SOME TIME

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MAY CHANGE ABRUPTLY, PARTICULARLY IF THE INFLUENCE OF THE
NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY EXPANDS. [SECRET]4

4. SPANISH SAHARA: A MOROCCAN DELEGATION WILL RETURN TO MADRID
THIS WEEK FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN OVER THE DISPOSITION OF
SPANISH SAHARA. 25X1X

IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON MADRID, MOROCCAN
MINISTER OF STATE FOR INFORMATION BENHIMA ANNOUNCED THAT THE
MARCHERS RETURNING FROM THE SAHARA WILL REMAIN AT TARFAYA UNTIL
NEGOTIATIONS END.4

MEANWHILE, ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE FLEW TO WESTERN
ALGERIA MONDAY TO MEET WITH MAURITANIAN PRESIDENT OULD
DADDAH. BOUMEDIENE, WHO STILL INSISTS ON A REFERENDUM FOR THE
SAHARANS UNDER UN AUSPICES, WILL ONCE AGAIN ATTEMPT TO CONVERT
THE MAURITANIAN LEADER TO HIS VIEW AND SEEK TO ELICIT FROM
OULD DADDAH DETAILS OF MOROCCO'S UNDERSTANDING WITH SPAIN.4

MAURITANIA SUPPORTS A PARTITION OF THE SAHARA WITH MOROCCO

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BUT IS WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH A LIMITED UN ROLE TO RESOLVE
 THE DISPUTE. MAURITANIAN OFFICIALS WOULD ACCEPT A REFERENDUM
 THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE INDEPENDENCE AS AN OPTION. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 177-75.4

A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN CEMA FOR HANOI: AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET - NORTH VIETNAMESE TALKS IN MOSCOW LATE LAST MONTH, HANOI HAS EVIDENTLY AGREED TO PLAY A MORE VISIBLE AND ACTIVE ROLE IN THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CEMA), BUT IT WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO SPURN FULL CEMA MEMBERSHIP.4

A SOVIET SOURCE RECENTLY SAID THAT THE EXPANDED RELATIONSHIP WILL INCLUDE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC PLANS, PARTICIPATION IN SOME CEMA PERMANENT COMMISSIONS, AND MULTILATERAL AID PROJECTS. HE ADDED THAT, FOR THE PRESENT, COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC PLANS WILL BE CONFINED TO THE FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR, AN AREA WHERE MOSCOW HAS ALREADY HAD A CONSIDERABLE, THOUGH INFORMAL, INPUT.4

THIS LOOSE FORMULATION OF HANOI'S MULTILATERAL TIES HOLDS SOME ADVANTAGES FOR BOTH PARTIES. MOSCOW HAS LONG ATTEMPTED TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF CEMA, AND CEMA PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAMESE RECONSTRUCTION AND

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DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WILL BOOST THE INTERNATIONAL
 IMAGE OF THE ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS BE A PLUS FOR
 MOSCOW IN THE SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE
 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL CON-
 TINUE THEIR BALANCING ACT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION
 AND CHINA, BUT WILL WELCOME WHATEVER ECONOMIC ASSIST-
 ANCE THEY CAN GET. FOR ITS PART, PEKING WILL UN-
 DOUBTEDLY BE CONCERNED OVER THE APPEARANCE OF A CLOSER
 NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP WITH CEMA. -CONFIDEN-
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EUROPEAN BRIEF 17⁴-754

1. SOVIETS PUT NEW EMPHASIS ON GENEVA CONFERENCE: MOSCOW HAS PUBLICIZED ITS NOTE TO THE US MONDAY CALLING FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THE NOTE INDICATES A HARDENING IN MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FORMAT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS. IN RECENT MONTHS, MOSCOW HAS NOT STRESSED GENEVA, SUGGESTING INSTEAD THAT THE USSR WAS INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN FURTHER PARTIAL PEACE STEPS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET NOTE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RULE OUT ADDITIONAL INTERIM MEASURES IN WHICH THEY HAVE A ROLE--SUCH AS ANOTHER GOLAN HEIGHTS DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT--IT CALLS FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE "THE ONLY CORRECT ROAD" TO A SETTLEMENT.

OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IS MOSCOW'S ASSERTION THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE "FROM THE VERY BEGINNING." HERETOFORE, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED VAGUER LANGUAGE REGARDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND PRIVATELY

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INDICATED THEY WERE CONSIDERING A VARIETY OF APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION. MOSCOW KNOWS PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA FROM THE START IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US AND ISRAEL.4

PUBLICATION OF THE NOTE WITH ITS FORMULA FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION INDICATES THE STATEMENT IS MEANT FOR THE RECORD RATHER THAN AS A SERIOUS SOVIET EFFORT TO RECONVENE THE CONFERENCE. ITS PUBLICATION MAY FORESHADOW AN EVEN MORE ASSERTIVE SOVIET PROFILE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARABS. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. SOVIETS MAY RECOGNIZE THE MPLA: SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA COULD COME AS EARLY AS TUESDAY.4

THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ANGOLA APPEARED LAST WEEKEND IN A PRAVDA COMMENTARY SIGNED "OBSERVER", WHICH INDICATES IT WAS ENDORSED BY THE KREMLIN. THE ARTICLE IMPLIED THAT MOSCOW

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WAS MOVING TOWARD OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE
 POPULAR MOVEMENT. BUT IT ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE
 SOVIETS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT
 THE SAGGING MILITARY FORTUNES OF THE MPLA.4

THE "OBSERVER" ARTICLE RESERVED ITS HEAVIEST
 BRICKBATS FOR THE "RACIST" REGIMES OF SOUTH AFRICA
 AND RHODESIA, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO ELICIT AD-
 DITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FROM
 OTHER BLACK AFRICAN STATES ON ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE
 DAY.4

IT MADE THE USUAL CHARGES AGAINST THE CHINESE
 BUT, IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER SOVIET COMMENTARY, DID
 NOT DIRECTLY MENTION US SUPPORT FOR ANTI-MPLA
 FORCES. THIS COULD MEAN THAT MOSCOW INTENDS TO
 PLAY DOWN THE LINE THAT THE US AND CHINA ARE ON THE
 SAME SIDE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE PROSPECTS OF THE
 ANTI-MPLA HAVE GROWN BRIGHTER. {CONFIDENTIAL} 4

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 174-75.4

//ARGENTINA: THE DEPARTURE OF NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES FROM ARGENTINA ON OCTOBER 29 MARKS A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN THE ALREADY STRAINED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT PERON'S GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA.//4

//THE ACTION OCCURRED WHEN THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY FAILED TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS THAT THE CHINESE WERE BEING HARASSED BY SPECIAL REGULATIONS REQUIRING THEM TO RENEW THEIR VISAS EVERY THREE MONTHS AND TO REQUEST 48-HOUR ADVANCE APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT THE GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY INTENDS TO CONTINUE THESE REQUIREMENTS, BUT NOW PLANS TO PROHIBIT COMMUNIST CHINESE PUBLICATIONS FROM ENTERING THE COUNTRY.//4

//THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ANAMALOUS FROM THE BEGINNING. ALTHOUGH ARGENTINE CLOSED ITS EMBASSY IN TAIPEI SOON AFTER RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED WITH CHINA IN FEBRUARY 1972, IT HAS ALLOWED THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO RETAIN A COMMERCIAL MISSION IN BUENOS AIRES. THEN PRESIDENT BANUSSE REPORTEDLY DID NOT WANT TO OFFEND HIGH-RANKING ARMY OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.//4

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//MEANWHILE, EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CLOSER ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC HAVE NOT BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE AGREED LAST YEAR TO PURCHASE ARGENTINE CORN AND WHEAT, THEY HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED BOTH WITH THE QUALITY OF THE GRAIN AND WITH ARGENTINA'S INABILITY TO SUPPLY AS MUCH AS IT HAD PROMISED.//Y

//OTHER PROBLEMS WILL PROBABLY CAUSE RELATIONS TO DETERIORATE FURTHER--THE ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL VIDELA, WHO IS HEADING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST INTERNAL SUBVERSION, RECENTLY SAID PUBLICLY THAT LOCAL TERRORISM IS RECEIVING EXTERNAL SUPPORT FROM COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS, INCLUDING PEKING. THE GOVERNMENT THAT SUCCEEDS PRESIDENT PERON'S ADMINISTRATION PROMISES TO BE AT LEAST AS CONSERVATIVE IN OUTLOOK AND MAY WELL BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MANIPULATION BY ANTI-PEKING MILITARY LEADERS. {SECRET NOFORN}// E-2 IMPDET.H

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